1. THE
TIMES, THE MAN, AND THE SYSTEM
In
general the
studies of Proclus, the last great representative of the Athenian
Academy, have
been concerned with the exposition of his conceptual structure of
reality. Emphasis has been placed on the
relation of
Proclian thought to the tradition of Plato, the Middle Platonists, and
Plotinus, especially with respect to the doctrine of the stages of
emanation
from the One. It is our intention in
this thesis, however, to consider the basis of Proclus’s ontology as
inherent
in that fundamental approach to reality which derives from a rejection
of sense
knowledge coupled with an affirmation of the nature of intelligibility
in terms
of “the conversion of the soul to itself”.
We shall stress only one aspect of the ontology resulting from
such a
methodological procedure: the
understanding of the meaning of human reality as found in Proclus’s
description
of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul.
This
orientation
towards our subject does, of course, reflect our own outlook on what is
“significant” in philosophy. But we
believe that at the same time it leads us to uncover a seldom
considered aspect
of Proclus’s own thought: its dependence
on a systematic and quite reasoned acceptance of the “truths” of human
knowledge
constituting its foundation. It is
certainly not customary to attribute any real concern for epistemology
to a
thinker like Proclus, but we propose that perhaps it is in the light of
this
concern that the significance of the Proclian influence on medieval
Arab and
Christian philosophy should be viewed.
In
addition to
doctrinal exposition, we also intend to stress the secondary factors
which, in
our opinion, predisposed Proclus to his ready acceptance of Platonic
idealism. For this reason we shall
consider
Proclus’s initial discrimination of knowledge in connection with his
general
interpretation of Plato and with those moral and intellectual virtues
which he
demands as prerequisite for philosophical study. Likewise,
in our treatment of Proclus’s
doctrine of intellection as leading to the formation of his system, we
shall
first consider the attitude towards Aristotle had by the Athenian
Neoplatonists, and we shall relate Proclus’s doctrine on man to the
historical
development of an attitude of philosophical “withdrawal” from the
world.For
the same
reason, in this first chapter before presenting Proclus’s biography and
a brief
description of his system which may sern as a general introduction to
our
study, we shall provide a view of the historical setting in which
Proclus
philosophized. We do not intend to say
that this setting is by any means an adequate explanation of the
Proclian
approach but we believe that against this background Proclus becomes
more
easily understood. Unfortunately we can
do little more than name those things which seem to us to have
significantly
influenced Proclus. A really
satisfactory treatment, in which these influences would be more
certainly
established and analyzed with adequate precision, is quite outside the
scope of
this work.
