Let's work with just these few thoughts: logic is easy (E), logic is fun (F), and logic is interesting (I)
When we assert E we do mean to say that it is true that logic is easy. If logic in fact is hard, then the truth value of the proposition E is false. Supposing I use the sentence ~F to express the thought that logic is not fun (and we will not build the "not" into the atomic sentence represented by F), we would see that if I'm wrong we would call ~F false (so that F is true) but if I'm right then we would call ~F true (so that F is false).
What this means, if we think about it, is that what we can call the
truth
value of any proposition that is not just a single letter is a function
of the truth value of its components. Our connectives or operators
set up what we mean by these truth-functional
relationships. Keep in mind, though, that this already restricts
the kinds of things that could be expressed. Whenever we say "might"
(Jack might pass the test) or "ought" (Jill ought to study) we are not
really thinking of something black or white, since one involves probability
and the other could be seen as possibly true from one point of view but
false from another. Symbolic logic, then, will actually be very limited
as a technique for representing our thoughts.
In the same way all the ideas of contrast or even of causality can disappear to focus simply on the thought that two things are true at the same time. "Logic is easy because it is fun" would be E&F and so would not point out the difference in meaning from "Logic is fun because it is easy." (Strictly speaking, causal relationships are not truth-functional.)
We can explain these truth-functional relationships by setting up
what we call truth tables.
| P | ~P |
| true | false |
| false | true |
| P | Q | P&Q | PvQ | P->Q | P<->Q |
| true | true | true | true | true | true |
| true | false | false | true | false | false |
| false | true | false | true | true | false |
| false | false | false | false | true | true |
If we think about what we are shown we can see that there are some key differences between what we might have in mind in conversation and the way our ideas would be expressed in a symbolic notation. When we say, for instance, I could order either fish or chicken at the restaurant, I do not ordinarily mean to say I have only two choices, but logical disjunction does mean there are just these choices. In the same way, it seems rather odd to have a logical implication be true when there might not be any further connection between the ideas, but when I say to a girl "If you are a boy then you will grow up to be President" I have a proposition that has to be classified as true just because the condition I'm setting up is false.
All of this may seem rather strange, but the point is that when we treat symbolic language as an artificial language we find that it does not completely map our natural languages (but then our written language does not map the spoken one, and our spoken language only very imperfectly maps our thoughts).
Let's do some exercises. First, we'll see how you might "translate" some simple English sentences, then we'll ask about whether the propositions would be true or false when we know something else about the atomic sentences making them up. On a piece of paper write out your own answers, then go on to another page where you will see mine.
Logic is both easy and fun.
Logic is not easy but it is fun.
Either logic is easy or it will not be fun.
If logic is easy then it will be interesting.
If logic is fun then it will be easy and interesting.
Logic will not be fun unless it is both interesting
and easy.
If it is false that logic is fun only if it
is easy, then it must be interesting.
Logic is both easy and fun if and only if
it is interesting.
Now decide which sentences are true and which are false if I start you off with the ideas that it's true logic is fun and it's true that logic is interesting, but it is false that logic is easy.